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Abstract
The governments of China, India, and the United Kingdom are unanimous in
their belief that bioinformatics should supply the link between basic life
sciences research and its translation into health benefits for the population
and the economy. Yet at the same time, as ambitious states vying for
position in the future global bioeconomy they differ considerably in the
strategies adopted in pursuit of this goal. At the heart of these differences
lies the interaction between epistemic change within the scientific com-
munity itself and the apparatus of the state. Drawing on desk-based
research and thirty-two interviews with scientists and policy makers in
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the three countries, this article analyzes the politics that shape this inter-
action. From this analysis emerges an understanding of the variable capa-
cities of different kinds of states and political systems to work with science
in harnessing the potential of new epistemic territories in global life sciences
innovation.
Keywords
politics, power, governance, markets/economies, other
Introduction
The contribution of bioinformatics to state strategies on life sciences inno-
vation has become an increasingly visible concern to governments.
Announcing a £32 million investment in bioinformatics in February
2014, the UK Minister for Science David Willetts emphasized its ‘‘huge
priority for government’’ and its ‘‘potential to drive research and develop-
ment, increase productivity and innovation and ultimately transform lives’’
(Medical Research Council [MRC] 2014). His statement built on the prom-
ise of the Strategy for UK Life Sciences to make the United Kingdom ‘‘a
world leader in genomics and bioinformatics’’ (UK Department for Busi-
ness, Innovation and Skills [BISs] 2012, 41) and on the ambition stated by
Jeremy Hunt, Secretary of State for Health, at the launch of Genomics
England and the 100,000 Genome Project in July 2013 to make the United
Kingdom ‘‘the first ever country to introduce this technology in its main-
stream health system—leading the global race for better tests, better drugs
and above all better, more personalized care to save lives’’ (Genomics
England 2014). Meanwhile, in India, the Department of Biotechnology
(DBT) is clear that the aim of its bioinformatics program and National
Bioinformatics Network is ‘‘to ensure that India emerges a key international
player in the field of bioinformatics; enabling a greater access to informa-
tion wealth created during the post-genomic era and catalysing the coun-
try’s attainment of lead position in medical, agricultural, animal and
environmental biotechnology’’ (India DBT 2014). This sense of national
priority echoes the tone of DBT’s earlier strategy document Bioinformatics
policy in India, which emphasizes that the requirements of innovation in
science and technology mean that it is ‘‘of utmost importance that India
participates in and contributes to the ensuing global bioinformatics revolu-
tion’’ (India DBT 2004, 3). And in China, the concern for keeping pace with
global life sciences innovation through investment in bioinformatics is
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reflected in the projects funded in that field by the Natural Science Founda-
tion of China (NSFC), the National High-tech Development Programme
(863 Programme), the National Key Basic Research Development Pro-
gramme (973 Programme), the National Science and Technology Major
Projects, and the National Key R and D Technology Programme (Ai and
Wang 2011; Wei and Lu 2008).
In terms of grand policy narratives, then, bioinformatics has come of age.
States now see bioinformatics as a key component in life sciences innova-
tion, in the pursuit of national advantage in the global knowledge markets of
the future and in the servicing of the health needs of their populations.
However, although they may agree on the importance of bioinformatics
to the national interest, states disagree on how the value of its contribution
to life sciences innovation can best be maximized. It is the purpose of this
article to explore the politics of innovation that shape the differences in
government strategies on bioinformatics. Central to this task is an under-
standing of the power relationship between science and the state, the dif-
ferent forms this relationship can take, and the impact of these differences
on a state’s ability to support and exploit new epistemic domains such as
bioinformatics.
The empirical vehicle for this analysis is the approach to bioinformatics
adopted by the United Kingdom, China, and India. In the United Kingdom,
we have an established player in the global competition for control of the
future benefits of the life sciences, one accustomed to the nuances and
difficulties inherent in the exploitation of its established science base. The
situation of China and India is quite different. These are economies with an
impressive track record in the penetration of existing global markets of
established products but limited experience in the science-based anticipa-
tion of future markets through informed, but essentially speculative, state
investment in emerging domains of the life sciences (Salter 2009a, 2009b).
Unsurprisingly, this does not limit their ambition to challenge the Western
hegemony in biomedical innovation, as their rapidly expanding commit-
ment to the life sciences eloquently testifies. The question is how far their
strategies on bioinformatics in support of this ambition are likely to influ-
ence the respective positions of the United Kingdom, China, and India in
the global competition for advantage in the life sciences.
This article addresses three sets of questions. First, what is the contri-
bution of bioinformatics to innovation in the life sciences, how has it devel-
oped, and what is its political value? What interests recognize this value and
how have they sought to capture it by guiding the emergence of bioinfor-
matics? Second, what is the contribution of the science–state relationship to
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the emergence of bioinformatics in the quite different political systems of
the United Kingdom, China, and India? How and why does this contribution
vary and what are the implications of this variation for a state’s ability to
support and exploit new epistemic domains? Finally, given this analysis of
the politics of bioinformatics, what is the balance of power between the
three countries in terms of their ability to exploit the contribution of bioin-
formatics to life sciences innovation?
To answer these questions, data were gathered in two phases. In the first,
Internet desk-based scoping exercises of existing policies on bioinformatics
in the three countries were conducted primarily through the analysis of
policy documents of state organizations responsible for the field of science
and technology (see Figures 1 and 2). In China, the focus was on publica-
tions of the State Council (e.g., National Five Year Plans, National Medium
and Long Term Programme for the Development of Science and Technol-
ogy, specific notices on bioindustry), the Ministry of Science and Technol-
ogy (MOST—e.g., 973 and 863 Programmes), and the National Science
Funding Council (NSFC—e.g., Five Year Plans); in India, on those of the
Planning Commission (e.g., Five Year Plans), DBT (e.g., National Biotech-
nology Development Strategy reports), the Department of Scientific and
Industrial Research, and the Department for Science and Technology (e.g.,
Working Group on Biotechnology annual plans); in the United Kingdom,
on those of the Department of BISs (e.g., Office of Life Sciences reports),
and the Research Councils (e.g., Biotechnology and Biological Sciences
Research Council [BBSRC] and MRC annual reports). Supporting material
was gathered from industry reports (e.g., Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and Industry [FICCI]), specialist reviews (e.g., Burrill Media),
and statistical sources such as those of the National Science Foundation
(NSF). The results of this phase were summarized in project working papers
and used as the platform for the development of a semistructured interview
schedule (Datta 2014; Zhou 2014). Thirty-two interviews were conducted
with leading bioinformaticians, other elite scientists (particularly in the
field of genomics), and policy makers from the state organizations listed
above, evenly spread across the three countries. The distribution of the
interviews by country and primary role (scientist or policy maker) is shown
in Table 1(a). Often a scientist would have a secondary role and also act in a
policy making capacity through formal membership of a state organization
and, in some cases, would have strong industry links. The numerical effect
of this overlap of roles within the interview sample is shown in Table 1(b).
The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed employing the
conceptual framework developed in the following two sections.
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Biomedical Innovation, Bioinformatics, and Political
Value
Generally conceived, innovation policies address the issue of how the state
may best maximize the economic and social benefits of its scientific invest-
ment. Indeed, the rise to prominence of ‘‘innovation’’ as a policy domain
owes much to its claim to be able to solve this thorny problem where others
(e.g., ‘‘translation’’ policy) have failed. Hence, the European Union (EU)
has its Innovation Union Initiative, United Kingdom its Innovation Nation
Policy, the United States its American Strategy for Innovation, India its
National Innovation Council, China its ‘‘new path of innovation with Chi-
nese characteristics’’ [zi-zhu-chuang-xin], and so on (Salter 2013). In bio-
medical innovation, the policy issue is seen as one of how to facilitate the
long, arduous, and uncertain process of scientific knowledge production
from the basic science, through clinical experimentation and trials, to the
therapeutic product. For example, the Cooksey report A Review of UK
Health Research Funding concluded ‘‘that the UK is at risk of failing to
reap the full economic, health and social benefits that the UK’s public
investment in health research should generate’’ (the state interest) as a result
of two key gaps. These are ‘‘translating ideas from basic and clinical
research into the development of new products and approaches to treatment
of disease and illness; and implementing those new products and
approaches into clinical practice’’ (Cooksey 2006, 3).
Ministry of Science &
Technology of China
(MOST)
The State Council of China
Natural Science
Foundaon of China
(NSFC
Naonal Key
R&D
Technology
Programme
Naonal
Science and
Technology
Major Project
Naonal Key Basic
Research development
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Naonal High-tech
Development
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Figure 1. Bioinformatics policy and funding: China state structures. Source: The
Ministry of Science and Technology of People’s Republic of China (http://www.most.
gov.cn/eng/programmes1/index.htm) and National Natural Science Foundation of
China (http://www.nsfc.gov.cn/).
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It is in the context of public scientific investment as a risk endeavor that
the political value of bioinformatics should be placed. Its political rise is a
product of its perceived value to the process of biomedical innovation and
the future markets to which such innovation gives access. As a discipline
and epistemic domain, bioinformatics combines the knowledge, skills and
techniques of biology, on the one hand, and computer science, statistics and
mathematics, on the other (Lewis and Bartlett 2013; Luscombe, Green-
baum, and Gerstein 2001). In terms of its application, its territory is broad
‘‘covering anything from epidemiology, the modelling of cell dynamics, to
its now more common focus, the analysis of sequence data of various kinds
(genomic, transcriptomic, proteomic, metabolomic)’’ (Harvey and McMee-
kin 2002, 10). Behind its emergence lies the problem faced by biology
when, from the 1980s onward, the volume, complexity, and variety of
biodata production outstripped the discipline’s capacity to conceptualize,
coordinate, analyze, and interpret it (Ouzounis and Valencia 2003). The fear
of being overwhelmed was palpable and public (Butler 2001; Reichhardt
1999), with official bodies such as the US National Institute of Health
Research recognizing that ‘‘the computers, algorithms, and software, let
alone the support infrastructure, are not keeping up with the exponentially
rising tide of data in biomedical research’’ (Botstein 1999). It is a concern
that is still very much evident among our interviewees, who often said
that ‘‘data generation kind of goes up quicker than computational power-
essentially the bottle neck is not generating that data, it’s how to use that
data’’ (Interview 4) and that ‘‘a new technology [such as sequencing or
Table 1(a). Number of Interviews by Role and Country.
China India United Kingdom Total
Science 8 8 10 26
Policy 2 1 3 6
Total 10 9 13 32
Table 1(b). Number of Overlapping Roles by Country.
China India United Kingdom Total
Science 10 8 10 28
Policy 6 5 7 18
Industry 1 1 4 6
Total 17 14 21 52
Salter et al. 7
 at University of East Anglia on March 10, 2016sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
microarrays] comes out and then bioinformatics is just thrown in and
has to somehow work out what to do with the new data that’s generated
from it’’ (Interview 4). Part of the perceived problem is that it is struc-
tural, embedded in funding agency policy where ‘‘funding is not usually
provided to help understand data, it’s provided to generate data’’ (Inter-
view 2).
The problem has been particularly acute in the field of genomics where,
fuelled by large government investment in projects such as the Human
Genome Project (HGP) and skillful scientific public relations, expectations
of this new field of ‘‘big science’’ (the HGP became known as the
‘‘Manhattan Project’’ of biology) were high but the promised benefits for
public health remained distant (Galison and Hevly 1992; Lenoir and Hays
2000). With the biodata deluge generating more complexity and less clarity,
something had to be done if genomic science was to maintain its impetus
and access to public and private resources. Bioinformatics was presented as
the epistemic and political answer. Hence, reports on genomics from the
UK House of Lords Science and Technology Committee and Department of
Health in the 2000s reiterate the difficulties faced by genomic medicine, the
challenges to bioinformatics posed by the new genome technologies, the
‘‘painfully slow’’ translation of scientific research into ‘‘patient benefit,’’
the promise that, as Professor Dame Janet Thornton, Director of the Eur-
opean Bioinformatics Institute (EBI), put it: ‘‘it will be the biomedical
informatics that will allow translations from knowledge and research into
medical practice,’’ and the importance of investment in the research and
training needs of bioinformatics (House of Lords Science and Technology
Committee 2001, 2009; Department of Health 2003). In 2009, the Depart-
ment of Health duly recognized that ‘‘The expansion in EMBL-EBI
[European Molecular Biology Laboratory-European Bioinformatics Insti-
tute] data management capacity is vital in underpinning the sustainable
development of the substantial investments in genetic, genomic and systems
biology made by the Research Councils’’ (Department of Health 2009, 18).
The formal political narrative was established with bioinformatics center
stage.
As the public solution to a major problem in biomedical innovation, the
position of bioinformatics in the policy narrative is secure. Yet at the same
time, its epistemic identity in science remains fraught with political ten-
sions. Integrating epistemic domains is a quintessentially political task
because disciplines are constituted not only in terms of intellectual con-
structs and practices but also in terms of institutions with their particular
interests and ambitions (Whitley 1976). Although the issue of how to deal
8 Science, Technology, & Human Values
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with large amounts of biological data had been present since at least the
1980s, the impact of the importation of mathematical and computer science
knowledge and skills into biology had initially been filtered through the
existing power structures of biology; a process which rendered bioinfor-
matics acceptable as a service function to the biological paradigm (Leonelli
and Ankeny 2012, 29-31). Genomics changed all that because it is large,
well-funded, highly complex and, most importantly, a state project that
cannot be seen to fail. As a result, its political muscle is helping to reengi-
neer the balance of power between the epistemic partners of bioinformatics.
At the heart of this reconfiguration is the question of which epistemic
paradigm should guide the organization and analysis of the biodata: mathe-
matics or biology? In the initial stages of the partnership, it was assumed
that mathematics and computer science would perform a data processing
function guided by the hypotheses of biological theory. There appeared to
be a natural convergence between the partners such that scholars described
it as a ‘‘natural marriage,’’ albeit one where one partner was manifestly
dominant over the other (Chow-White and Garcia-Sancho 2012, 14). More
recently, this view of relationship development has been shown to be an
overoptimistic interpretation of epistemic cohabitation. In its place has
emerged a view of balance in the interdisciplinary production of bioinfor-
matics and a recognition that it ‘‘will require some fundamental changes in
biological assumptions on the part of biologists, and mathematical assump-
tions on the part of the ‘‘import’’ disciplines’’ (Harvey and McMeekin 2002,
21). In that happy situation, the new mathematical tools produced for ana-
lyzing biodata are then seen as both ‘‘the objects of knowledge production
for the expert bioinformatician community and instruments for knowledge
production for the wider molecular biology community’’ (Harvey and
McMeekin 2007, 20). Bioinformatics performs a creative as well as a ser-
vice function.
The political tensions inherent in this epistemic transition constitute
part of wider shifts in the role of ‘‘big data,’’ as it has become known, in
the scientific endeavor. The collection, storage, and analysis of very large
data sets are not peculiar to biology. Indeed, compared to disciplines such
as physics, chemistry, and climate science, biology is very much a late
arrival in the big data domain (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013;
Hey, Tansley, and Tolle 2009). Practices devoted to the extraction of
inferences from data in silico have become sufficiently sophisticated that
‘‘computational tools for data analysis are assigned a prominent role in
facilitating the extraction of patterns from data, while experimental work
is conceived as means to verify and explain those patterns’’ (Leonelli
Salter et al. 9
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2012a, 50). The consequence is that the creative power in the interdisci-
plinary relationship moves to mathematics and computer science. The
effect of this power transfer is to challenge the ways in which science
is organized and practiced through the forms of collaboration, division of
labor and integrative strategies (of models, data, theories, and software)
set up to deal with the fact of big data. As a result, Leonelli claims,
‘‘Data-intensive methods are changing what counts as good science’’
(2012b, 2). As the bioinformatics space is progressively institutionalized,
so new power roles are emerging to allow the benefits of the data bases
to be exploited by a variety of global audiences. For example, curators
act to create bioontologies, and adapt existing ones, in order to organize
the data into a form capable of meeting the research needs of bioinfor-
maticians and biologists alike (Leonelli 2012a, 58-59). In so doing, they
are, as Farquhar and Sundar Rajan put it, engaging in ‘‘the rendering
political of information, in and through its relationship with the database
and archive’’ (Farquhar and Sunder Rajan 2014, 388).
Such is the significance of the power transfer that the traditional para-
digm of hypothesis-driven research is being replaced by what has been
termed ‘‘discovery science,’’ where the database is established first and the
explanations of the patterns they contain follow later (Chow-White and
Garcia-Sancho 2012, 146). Biology is becoming a ‘‘data-bound science’’
driven by the imperatives and logic of the database rather than by hypoth-
eses derived from biological theory and applied to observation (Lenoir
1999, 35). In the workplace, the in silico ‘‘dry labs’’ of electronic databases
and computation are becoming equally as important as the traditional in
vivo ‘‘wet lab’’ as the primary location of disciplinary activity (BBSRC
2012). It is in this political space that the identity of bioinformatics is being
forged. The evidence of our interviews suggests that the struggle continues
within science for control of this political space and its strategic position in
the territory of biomedical innovation. Tensions abound between the
‘‘laboratory style of reasoning’’ and the ‘‘statistical style of reasoning’’
employed in the work of wet and dry labs (Penders, Horstman, and Vos
2008, 749) and ‘‘the terms ‘‘data-driven’’ and ‘‘hypothesis-free’’ have
become focal points of debates about the legitimacy of bioinformatics
techniques and methods’’ (Stevens 2013, 66). There is no agreed definition
of the bioinformatics identity but a strong awareness of the fact that the
space exists, its scientific and political significance, the formative role of
genomics and of the competing disciplinary ambitions for its future. How
does the state then deal with both the potential and the uncertainty of this
new territory?
10 Science, Technology, & Human Values
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States, Science, and the Politics of Innovation
The competition between states for control of biomedical innovation is
driven by the anticipated demand of future populations for improved and
more efficient health care, the future knowledge market generated by this
demand, and the economic benefits that will accrue to those able to shape
access to that market to their advantage. In the bioeconomy as elsewhere,
the advanced economies of North America and Europe met the uncertain-
ties accompanying the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of mass
production and consumption with the evolution of the ‘‘competition’’ state
as the vehicle for the pursuit of national advantage through innovation
(Cerny 1997; Hay 2004). Rather than concerning themselves with govern-
ment interventions to ensure full employment and respond to market
failures, states began to focus their attention instead on the neoliberal
supply-side policies that would give a sharp edge to their competitiveness
in the global knowledge economy. Particularly in the case of the
knowledge-driven bioindustries, this meant a concentration not only on the
infrastructures of innovation but also on ‘‘agglomeration and network
economies and the mobilization of social as well as economic sources of
flexibility and entrepreneurialism’’ (Jessop 2002, 110). As a consequence,
the competition states of the West have moved away from the national
sponsorship of particular firms and technologies and toward policies
designed to foster ‘‘the conditions necessary for innovation.’’ Rather than
specific structural change, the competition state goal is seen to be one of
stimulating a dynamic that enables the knowledge production process to
become self-sustaining. As we shall see, the scientific community plays a
key role in maintaining that dynamic.
While this analysis provides insights into the state’s likely role in life
sciences innovation in the developed economies of the West, a different
approach is necessary in the case of the emerging economies of the devel-
oping world. Focusing in the main on South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and
Singapore in the 1980s and early 1990s, the earlier work on the ‘‘develop-
mental state’’ highlights its role in the promotion of rapid economic devel-
opment through the targeting of particular industries with large global
markets. The markets were already there. The political task was to penetrate
them. To achieve this goal, the state protected its chosen industries using a
range of policies such as import and credit controls, promoted them through
state investment, guided private capital through incentive schemes, and
measured their progress in terms of export achievements (Onis 1991).
Backed by a strong, professional, and autonomous bureaucracy, the state
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sought to define the specific path of industrialization through the ‘‘govern-
ment of the market’’ (Wade 2003). In this analysis, the essence of those states’
commonality is that they sought to challenge the control exercised by the
developed world over the dynamic of globalization. If they were to access the
wealth of global markets, if they were to ‘‘catch up’’ with Western countries,
then the power of the state was required to make globalization work for them.
However, having caught up using the targeting of known markets as a
primary policy objective, developmental states face the problem of ‘‘keep-
ing up’’ in the context of future markets like those generated by the life
sciences that are either unknown or decidedly uncertain (Weiss 2000). Like
competition states, they are obliged to adapt their strategies of direct state
intervention when faced with the innovation requirements of a science with
a speculative future, an uncertain market, and a difficult path to commer-
cialization (Lee and Schrank 2010). As a consequence, scholars have noted
the evolution of developmental state governance into new forms described
variously as the ‘‘adaptive state,’’ the ‘‘flexible state,’’ the ‘‘speculative
state,’’ the ‘‘post-industrial developmental state,’’ the ‘‘transformative state,’’
and the ‘‘catalytic state’’ in their studies of Japan, China, India, South Korea,
and Taiwan (Kim 1999; Salter 2009a; Wu 2004; Wong 2005). In seeking to
move from borrowers to innovators in the life sciences, developmental states
are obliged to review their modus operandi and the style of the bureaucracy
that helps formulate and implement their innovation policies.
Central to the state’s role in life sciences innovation is a clear under-
standing of how the state relates to the scientific community and to the
interests of that community. Like all enduring political arrangements, in the
developed economies that relationship has historically been founded on an
exchange of mutual benefits. Science supplies the state with a flow of
knowledge that can enable the delivery of economic and social benefits
to its citizens. The state supplies science with the resources to pursue its
research interests. Supporting this core agreement is an infrastructure of
embedded institutions and values designed to maintain the relationship’s
authority and legitimacy; promote continuing engagement between the two
partners; and facilitate the addition of new, mutually beneficial, and scien-
tific dimensions to the agreement (Jasanoff 2004). Political exchange is
continuous with scientists lending their expertise and authority to the activ-
ities of the state’s policy advisory system and the state facilitating and
legitimizing science’s system of self-regulation (Jasanoff 1994). Although
a permanent marriage, tensions undoubtedly exist within it and commenta-
tors differ in their interpretation of how these tensions alter its internal
balance of power. In his work on the scientific elite of the United Kingdom
12 Science, Technology, & Human Values
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and the United States, Mulkay emphasizes the power of the scientific elite,
arguing that it ‘‘operates as a ‘buffer group’ [between science and state],
successfully resisting instrumental demands from outside and maintaining
considerable freedom for members of the academic research community to
pursue their own ‘scientifically defined’ interests’’ (1976, 445). Here, the
state sets the overall budget, but the scientific elite decides which area of
science gets what. Others are skeptical of this view of scientific autonomy
and present the state as the dominant partner who defines the scientific
agenda in terms of the state’s political interest, and, in the case of the United
States, uses science to legitimize government policies and programs
(Mukerji 1989; Solovey 2001).
Interpretations of the balance of power between science and the state in
developed economies may vary but all are agreed that the political relation-
ship is one of mutual dependence where political resources such as finance,
expertise, and decision-making are exchanged through an established com-
plex of institutions, networks, and understandings. The situation in the
emerging economies is quite different. On the one hand, the commitment
to investment in science is clearly present. Between 2001 and 2011, the R
and D investment of the economies of East, Southeast, and South Asia
(including China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan) increased far more rapidly than that of the West, with the result
that their share of global R and D rose from 25 percent to 34 percent (NSF
2014, chapter 4). Much of this change has been driven by China, which has
experienced a real annual growth in its R and D budget in this period of 18
percent, reaching US$208 billion in 2011, and making it the second highest
in the world league table of R and D expenditure (NSF 2014, chapter 4). On
the other hand, these impressive figures are not a product of joint science–
state initiatives characterized by evenly balanced partnerships. Rather, at
the outset, governments have certainly led and science has followed. The
reasons are not hard to find. First, until recently, the developing countries
did not see investment in science as a priority: they were concerned with
existing not future markets. For example, China’s R and D investment in
1991 was 0.73 percent of gross domestic product rising to only 0.91 percent
in 2001. The US equivalent was 2.72 percent for both years (NSF 2014,
appendix table 4.13). Science, and most of all basic science, lacked political
value—until the developmental state adopted innovation as its leitmotif in
the late 1990s (Wong 2011). Second, and consequentially, the scientific
community in such countries is still building its epistemic identity, institu-
tions, status, and relationships with the state. In China, for example, a
scientific elite is emerging, but it is inexperienced and lacks the
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characteristics normally associated with successful scientific communities
such as self-regulation and promotion by merit (Cao and Suttmeier 2001;
Suttmeier and Cao 1999). The implications of this relatively immature level
of development in the scientific community are considerable. Science in the
emerging economies lacks the political infrastructures for the internal and
external management of epistemic change taken for granted in the West.
While in the latter, the negotiations over who should benefit from the
emergence of new epistemic territory such as bioinformatics may be tense,
they are nonetheless handled within a set of institutions such as the UK
research councils accustomed to (a) resolving allocation disputes internally
and (b) translating the results into political demands on the state. Such
mechanisms are largely absent in China and India with the result that the
science–state relationship takes a quite different form.
Reinforcing these differences is a third factor: science is a transnational
enterprise dominated by the West. The continuing migration of scientific
labor from the developing to the developed countries reinforces existing
scientific communities and constrains the formation of new ones (Hunter,
Oswald, and Charlton 2009). At the India Institute of Science in 2005, 90
percent of those who finish PhDs chose to move overseas (Jayaraman
2005). In 2004, China’s Ministry of Personnel estimated that of about
580,000 students who had traveled abroad to study since the late 1970s,
only 27 percent had returned (Li et al. 2004). Lacking the political muscle
derived from the historic relationship with the state enjoyed by Western
scientific communities, the scientific elites of the emerging economies
remain largely supporting players in the politics of global science, with
their entry to the transnational scientific networks contingent upon their
attractiveness as potential partners in collaborative research (Wagner and
Laydesdorff 2005). Thus, in a sense, it can be said that developmental and
competition states have done what they have always done. The former have
used bureaucracy and targeted finance to build innovation capacity in the
future markets of science, the latter have relied on their historic dominance
of the global knowledge markets through the transnational power of their
scientific elites to persuade key elements of that capacity into the scientific
jurisdictions of competition states. How far is this true of bioinformatics?
State Strategies in China, India, and the United
Kingdom
A simple structural comparison of the state organizations with the respon-
sibility for supporting the development of bioinformatics in China, India,
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and the United Kingdom reveals some initial and instructive differences
(Figures 1–3). In China and, to a lesser extent, India, departments of state
play the dominant role in the formulation and execution of policy on bioin-
formatics. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, although the Depart-
ment of BIS controls the overall size of the budget, the details of
bioinformatics policy are worked out at the level of the research councils
where the scientific community is the dominant influence. The top-down
style of innovation governance of the developmental state is most obvious
in China, where the State Council sets the agenda across policy domains
through its five-year plans for economic development. The relevant sub-
ordinate departments, in the case of science and technology policy, the
MOST and the NSFC, then faithfully interpret that agenda within their
established funding programs and show where and how they will deliver
the policy goals laid down by the State Council. MOST deals mainly with
large applied and product-oriented projects of US$4 to US$5 million and
the NSFC with basic research of less than US$100,000. In India, likewise,
the five-year plans of the Planning Commission, though less rigidly
enforced than in China, provide the priority setting framework for the
MOST and the DBT with the latter holding the primary responsibility for
bioinformatics.
Using these plans as a policy tracking tool, we can see that the signifi-
cance of bioinformatics was first recognized in India with the launch of the
Biotechnology Information System network by DBT in 1986 ‘‘to create an
infrastructure that enables it [India] to harness biotechnology through the
application of bioinformatics’’ (DBT 2014). A decade later in China, bioin-
formatics first makes its appearance in the 9th Five Year Plan of MOST’s
National High-tech Development Programme (863 Programme) with the
commitment in 1996 to fund a project on the ‘‘Development and Establish-
ment of a Database for Bioinformatics’’ and a center for bioinformatics
within the College of Life Sciences at Beijing University, with the intention
that it should act as the official mirror site for major international biological
databases (Wei and Yu 2008, 1). Thereafter, an analysis of the five-year
plans of the relevant state agencies of both China and India show the
continuing presence of lists of projects apparently designed to enhance the
bioinformatics capacity of the two countries through the creation of data-
bases, clusters, networks, and skills (Datta 2014; Zhou 2014). In the decade
up to 2014, the total funds committed were £303 million in China and £19
million in India (Tables 2 and 3).
To understand the significance of these figures, it is necessary to place
them in their structural context. In the case of the apparently large Chinese
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Table 2(a). China: MOST Funding of Bioinformatics (2005-2014).
Year Scheme Category
Funding
(£ million)
2005 The National Program for
Sci-Tech Basic Conditions
Platform Construction
during the Year of 2004 to
2010
0.3
2006 863 Programme Bioinformation and
computational biological
technology
8.0
2007 863 Programme Bioinformation and
computational biological
technology
6.5
2008 863 Programme Bioinformation and
computational biological
technology
2.0
863 Programme Biological and medical
technology-genome-wide
association study and
pharmacogenomics study on
common severe diseases
20.0
Eleventh five-year National Key
Technology R&D Plan
Key technology development
and demonstration of public
information share and
exchange for biotechnology
industry
3.0
Second call for eleventh five-
year plan National Science
and Technology Major
Project
New drug creation and
development (2009-2010)
216.0
2010 2011 National Science and
Technology Major Project
New drug creation and
development
10.0
2011 2012 National Science and
Technology Major Project
New drug creation and
development
N/A
2013 863 Programme (2014) 20.0
2014 863 Programme (2015) Biological and medical
technology—key technology
of biological big data
development and application
N/A
Total 285.8
Source: The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of the People’s Republic of China
(http://www.most.gov.cn/).
Note: N/A ¼ Not applicable.
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investment, guiding the allocations are the policies of the State Council
geared entirely to economic needs not to the needs of a fledgling epistemic
domain. For example, bioinformatics is included as an industry servicing
agent in the Council’s Some policies promoting the development of bio-
industry (2009), Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Foster-
ing and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries (2010), and Notice
of the State Council on Issuing the Bio-Industry Development Plan (2012;
State Council of the PRC 2009, 2010, 2012). Acting within this frame,
MOST takes the same approach to bioinformatics, for example, in its
Table 2(b). China: NSFC Funding of Bioinformatics (2005-2013).
Year Funding (£ million)
2005 0.9
2006 1.0
2007 0.9
2008 0.8
2009 1.2
2010 0.7
2011 2.4
2012 3.3
2013 3.6
Total 14.8
Source: National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC; isisn.nsfc.gov.cn).
Table 3. India: Department of Biotechnology Funding of Bioinformatics (2005-
2014).
Year Funding (£ million)
2005-2006 1.7
2006-2007 2.3
2007-2008 2.1
2008-2009 2.1
2009-2010 1.2
2010-2011 2.2
2011-2012 1.9
2012-2013 2.0
2013-2014 2.5
Total 18.0
Source: Datta (2014, annex 1).
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12th Five Year Plan for the Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry (MOST
2012a). Such an approach leads to call specifications directly linked to
bioindustry such as the £3 million call of the 973 Programme in
2008-2010 for three projects: ‘‘The Development of Database for Bio-
technology and Industrial Information,’’ ‘‘The Standardization, Integration
and Application of Bio-technology and Industrial Information,’’ and ‘‘The
Grid-based Key Technology and Software for Bioinformation’’ (MOST
2012b, 43).
As a result, as shown in Table 2, over 70 percent of bioinformatics
funding is for specific application-oriented research provided by the
industry-oriented MOST. Within this, the majority funding (£216 million
of the total £285.8 million) is via the applied ‘‘New Drug Creation and
Development’’ scheme (Nature 2010). In contrast, China’s agency for the
funding of basic research—the NSFC—plays a minor role in state support
for bioinformatics characterized by the funding of a plethora of small proj-
ects (£14.8 million 2005-2013). Reflecting on the nature of bioinformatics
funding, a senior manager of the Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI) com-
mented that apart from the three calls for the ‘‘Bioinformation and Compu-
tational Biological Technology’’ scheme of MOST’s 863 Programme,
‘‘there are basically no funds for this discipline [bioinformatics] . . . but
some relevant bioinformatics projects can win support every year’’ (Inter-
view 9).
Meanwhile, in India, the Five Year Plans of the Planning Council have,
since their inception in 1951, focused on how the economic interest of the
country can best be served by the policies of the departments of state. By the
early 2000s, the narrative of the Plans in the field of science and technology
had become the pursuit of ‘‘global leadership.’’ Hence in the Tenth Five
Year Plan 2002-2007, for example, bioinformatics was selected as one of
the fields that was ‘‘expected to be all pervasive and have far-reaching
impact’’ in India’s bid to become a global leader, building on the nation’s
experience in IT and pharmaceuticals (Planning Commission 2002,
10.159). Similarly, in Biotechnology: A Vision—Ten Year Perspective, the
guiding document for the DBT for the 2001-2010 period, genomics and
bioinformatics are listed as the first two biotech areas for development
(DBT 2001). What is less clear from the voluminous policy documentation
of the Planning Commission and the DBT is how this objective is to be
achieved in terms of its necessary engagement with the scientific commu-
nity. Mention is routinely made of the need for infrastructure elements such
as workforce training, new bioinformatics courses, the establishment of
bioinformatics institutes, and international linkage, but how these are to
Salter et al. 19
 at University of East Anglia on March 10, 2016sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
be integrated in the absence of a guiding scientific paradigm of epistemic
change remains opaque (see, e.g., DBT 2007, 2014; Working Group on
Biotechnology 2011). Furthermore, there are radical shifts in state enthusi-
asm for the bioinformatics project. Thus, the extensive discussion of bioin-
formatics in the Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-2012 is oddly matched by its
very limited presence in the Twelfth Five Year Plan 2012-2017, where there
are proposals on the expansion of computerized databases of patient records
but little mention of the development of the field as a whole. Even the
routine report in the Twelfth Plan on the Eleventh Plan’s achievements fails
to mention ‘‘bioinformatics’’ (Planning Commission 2013, BOX 8.4: 250)
As with China, construction of a new bioinformatics epistemic identity is
clearly not the state’s objective since this would require an explicit scien-
tific conceptualization of how state support for particular epistemic quali-
ties of bioinformatics can enable the translation of genomic knowledge into
health-care products. Rather, there is an assumption that the components of
such support are self-evident and only need to be listed in order to have the
desired effect (Datta 2014; Zhou 2014).
The evidence from our China and India interviews strongly suggests that
this deficiency is the result of, on the one hand, the state’s failure to engage
and recruit relevant sections of the scientific community and, on the other,
the inability of science itself to formulate a coherent epistemic view of how
bioinformatics should be incorporated into biomedical innovation. The
approach adopted to bioinformatics development in these states appears
to be an outcome not of a scientific understanding of the needs of biome-
dical innovation (which itself is an outcome of epistemic political bargain-
ing within science) but of the state’s interpretation of what those needs
might be, given its preoccupation with economic development as the driv-
ing organizational principle. Disaffection with this approach is most evident
in China, where interviewees point to the failure to establish a national
center for bioinformatics as a symbolic example of the state’s insensitivity
to demands from the scientific community. One leading bioinformatician
described how scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences originally
petitioned MOST for a national bioinformatics center in 1999, but to little
effect. The suggested explanation provides a flavor of the state–science
relationship.
Chinese officials don’t know the importance of a national center for scientific
research in China. They think that a new national center is a kind of waste
because international databases are open access to Chinese scientists.
Another reason is about leadership. More and more Chinese universities and
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institutes are conducting bioinformatics research and establishing their own
bioinformatics center. Which university or institute, or who, can be the leader
of this large project? China won’t take any action until we find a proper
answer to this question. (Interview 25)
As the interviews make clear, the problem for Chinese scientists is that
without a national bioinformatics center they lack the political muscle to
integrate their many and various domestic bioinformatics activities, then to
engage on equal terms with the major international databases of the West
and Japan in terms of setting the agenda and direction for their develop-
ment. The United States’s National Center for Biotechnology Information
(NCBI), the United Kingdom’s EBI, and the DNA Databank of Japan
(DDBJ) constitute core elements in the global infrastructure of bioinfor-
matics and a ‘‘dominant, hegemonic presence’’ to which China has only
conditional access (Harvey and McKeekin 2010, 492). China does have the
BGI with a global operation and offices in the United States, United King-
dom, Japan, and Denmark. However, as the interview with a senior BGI
manager made clear, unlike the NCBI, EBI, and DDBJ, its business model
is based solely on the supply of bioinformatic services to science and
industry, not on the active furtherance of bioinformatics as a discipline
through the provision of a platform for international research, the organi-
zation and promotion of data sharing, and professional training (Interview
15). For example, BGI has a the ‘‘Green Super Rice’’ project funded by the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation that provides a sequencing service to
other grantees of the Gates Foundation and is a partner in the Genome 10K
Consortium of Scientists (G10KCOS—China Daily 2013; G10KCOS
2015). China’s leading bioinformatics center BGI engages readily with the
international scientific community and global bioinformatics markets, but it
does so on a reactive rather than proactive basis, lacking the capacity to act
as a promotional national center for China’s own bioinformatics
development.
Indian scientists are equally concerned about the absence of a national
bioinformatics center and the fact that there is ‘‘no common platform where
all the data can reside together and people can join to do analysis and
collaborate with people for analysis’’ (Interview 26). India does have spe-
cialist institutes such as the India Statistical Institute engaging in bioinfor-
matics research but, as with BGI, not the promotion of the discipline itself.
Part of the problem are differences between state organizations regarding
the appropriate model to be used in fostering biomedical innovation. As one
clearly frustrated interviewee put it:
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The Ministry of Health has a different approach [to biomedical innovation].
Within the Ministry of Science and Technology, CSIR, which is a department
in itself, has a different approach. DBT has a different approach, and DSD has
a different approach. And then you have the Ministry of Commerce which has
a different approach. (Interview 27)
One noticeable effect of this fragmentation of direction at the state level is
the lack of fit between bioinformatics skills training in India and the
advanced needs of genomics-based biomedical innovation such as dealing
with very large data sets (Interview 14). Similar views were expressed by
Chinese scientists, often placing their comments in the context of the
absence of a national bioinformatics center that could and should act as a
focus for research-linked skills training comparable to that provided by the
United Kingdom’s EBI.
The presence of a national bioinformatics center in the United Kingdom
since 1994 and not, thus far, in China and India reflects the balance of
power in the science–state relationship in the three countries. That balance
of power is in itself a product of the ability, or otherwise, of the scientific
community in the three countries to deal with internal epistemic change
and, if successful, then drive forward the resulting agreement. The United
Kingdom’s European Molecular Biology Laboratory–EBI is Europe’s hub
for big data in biology (EBI 2014). It exists because ‘‘science has brought
these things together,’’ scientists ‘‘have had to organize themselves in terms
of how they co-ordinate together,’’ and European research ‘‘works through
a bottom-up approach’’ (Interview 22). Contrast this with the situation in
China and India where the identity of the new discipline remains one where
the biosciences, lacking the historic capacity to set the epistemic agenda
with the state, simply allow computing science to contribute a service rather
than a creative function to the interdisciplinary relationship. A leading
Chinese bioinformatician commented: ‘‘Many people recognize the signif-
icance of bioinformatics for studying bioscience as an instrumental disci-
pline, but fail to see or value its existence and development as a discipline
itself’’ (Interview 10). In the United Kingdom, with science driving the
process of change in bioinformatics through the internal politics of its
scientific community, an underlying scientific paradigm has been devel-
oped to guide and legitimize that change—one that is absent in the state
dominated initiatives of China and India. Hence, we find that the BBSRC’s
annual reports over the last decade not only place a growing emphasis on
bioinformatics but also conceptualize this change in particular ways. For
example, the 2012 report Bioscience for Society. A Ten Year Vision, having
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noted with approval, the exponential growth of experimental data and the
increasing use of in silico–based modes of research, develops a concept of
‘‘predictive biology’’ with experimental data, models, and bioinformatics
tools at its center (BBSRC 2012, Figure 1).
The epistemic construction of the new disciplinary identity has been
matched by a continuing search by the UK scientific community for
resources from a variety of public and private resources. Thus, the EBI is
located on the Wellcome Trust Genome Campus in Cambridge and is
funded by the Wellcome Trust, the BBSRC, MRC, EU, European Member
States, National Institutes of Health (NIH), the European Molecular Biol-
ogy Organization, and the pharmaceutical industry. As this list implies,
running the EBI is an internationally competitive business with other
national bioinformatics centers the main rivals. In this context, the support
of the UK state for EBI bids for international resources such as those of the
EU is a significant advantage (Interview 22). At the same time, with sci-
entific interests defining the agenda, the institutional expression of those
interests across the research councils has been politically aligned through a
division of funding labor between the BBSRC, MRC, Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), and NERC and their dis-
tinctive contributions to the development of bioinformatics made explicit
through a Cross-Council Funding Agreement (see EPSRC 2014). The result
is a steadily increasing level of research council funding for bioinformatics
totaling £163.9 million since 2005 (Table 4).
Given that UK science has both an agenda and a plan for the develop-
ment of bioinformatics, the role of the UK state in pursuit of national
advantage becomes one of facilitating that agenda through financial and
political support at national and international levels. With regard to the
latter, it has a head start over its Chinese and Indian competitors because
of the global hegemony of Western states in the life sciences. Originally
propelled by the HGP and HapMap projects, the creation of global institu-
tions supporting databases by Western states rendered ‘‘genomics a selec-
tively global industry, creating a specific map determined by Western
science, technology, and government and economic interest’’ (Thacker
2006, 18). Control of the databases ensures that Western science set the
rules both for their operation and for the requirements of access to them.
Hence, there is a much lower chance of incorporation of data from less
prestigious, non-English-speaking laboratories in developing countries and
less chance of the scientists from such countries participating in the devel-
opment of international databases (Leonelli 2014, 10). One leading Chinese
bioinformatician described how he was still waiting for access after
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Table 4(a). United Kingdom: BBSRC Funding of Bioinformatics (2005-2014).
Year Category/theme
Funding
(£ million)
2005 Bioinformatics 0.0
2006 Bioinformatics and biological resources fund pilot 6.4
2008 Bioinformatics and biological resources 5.5
2009 Bioinformatics and biological resources 6.7
2010 Bioinformatics and biological resources 7.1
2011 Bioinformatics and biological resources 5.5
2012 2011-2013 Tools and resources development fund call 2 1.9
2012 Bioinformatics and biological resources 6.6
2012 Tools and resources development fund call 2 (bioinformatics
tools and computational approaches to the biosciences)
1.5
2013 Bioinformatics and biological resources 6.0
2014 Bioinformatics and biological resources 6.5
Total 53.7
Source:Data from ‘‘BBSRC20 Years of Pioneering’’: http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/web/FILES/Publications/a
nniversary-brochure.pdf. Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC):
http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk.
Table 4(b). United Kingdom: MRC Funding of Bioinformatics (2012-2015).
Year Category/theme
Funding
(£ million)
2012 MRC/Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council
systems immunology of the human life course
3.0
2012 Initiatives in informatics research 19.0
2013 Initiatives in informatics research 20.0
2014 Initiative in medical bioinformatics 39.1
2015 Initiative in medical bioinformatics 10.9
Total 92.0
Source: Medical Research Council (MRC): http://www.mrc.ac.uk.
Table 4(c). United Kingdom: EPSRC Funding of Bioinformatics (2013).
Year Category/theme Funding (£ million)
To present Biological informatics 14.2
Source: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC): http://www.epsrc.ac.uk/
research/ourportfolio/researchareas/bioinformatics/.
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applying to the NCBI database of Genotypes and Phenotypes four years ago
(Interview 23).
What Harvey and McKeekin have termed the ‘‘political economy of self-
regulation in bioinformatics’’ serves to fuel the continuing evolution of
fresh forms of governance regarding quality, standards, and norms by the
international scientific community. They cite the proliferating range of
bioinformatics tools developing standards for harmonizing the ‘‘ontolo-
gies’’ of data in diverse databases through organizations such as the Micro-
array Gene Expression Data Society, the Macromolecular Structure
Database as part of the worldwide Protein DataBank, and the Gene Ontol-
ogy Consortium project (Harvey and McKeekin 2010, 502). Such examples
of the institutional controls continuously generated by Western science
illustrate the hegemonic dynamic of bioinformatics governance which
began with the creation of the Bermuda rules in 1996. Attended by the
Wellcome Trust, the NIH National Center for Genome Research, the US
Department of Energy, the HGP of Japan, the German HGP, the UK MRC,
and the European Commission, this meeting set out the new rules for the
deposition of genomic data as a precondition for international collaboration
between contributing laboratories to the HGP (Harvey and McKeeking
2007, 55). Since then, Western transnational networks of science have
constructed through their communities of experts a political architecture
of bioinformatics self-regulation with which Chinese and Indian scientist
are obliged to collaborate on Western terms. If they do not accept the
standards embedded in this hegemony, they will not get published (Inter-
view 14).
Chinese and Indian scientists recognize the fact of Western dominance in
bioinformatics and typically see their development in this field as behind
the global pace, describing themselves as ‘‘4-5 years behind the West’’
(Interview 18—China) and ‘‘we’re always laggards’’ (Interview 14—
India). A director of a Chinese genomics research center commented:
‘‘Bioinformatics in China is still at a relatively early stage, with few
Table 4(d). United Kingdom: NERC Funding of Bioinformatics (2012-2019).
Year Category/theme
Funding
(£ million)
2012-2019 Mathematics & informatics for environmental omic data
synthesis
4.0
Source: Natural Environment Research Council (NERC): http://www.nerc.ac.uk.
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internationally influential articles, databases, algorithms, and software. The
collaboration between bioinformatics research and experimental biology is
not adequate’’ (Interview 11). From the UK perspective, although bioinfor-
maticians interviewed would frequently have collaborations with scientists
in the United States, Europe, and Japan via common databases and net-
works, their collaboration with China and India is, at best, described in
terms of potential and the provision of advice rather than regular interaction
with equal partners. From this imbalance between developed and develop-
ing countries then stems the frustration of Chinese and Indian scientists with
what they see as their governments’ failure to fight their corner, documen-
ted earlier. A further difficulty for China and India is that the hegemony
rests not just on the global reach of the Western scientific community but
also on the market infrastructure that supports it. Bioinformatics in the
developed world engages with a vibrant industry anxious to provide both
services and creative input to the translation of genomic data into clinical
utility (Harvey and McKeekin 2007). EBI has an organizational arm
devoted to the cultivation and maintenance of such relationships, including
an EBI-bioinformatics industry ‘‘club’’ that meets four times a year to
exchange views and develop agendas (Interview 22). And the newly estab-
lished Genomics England, although a government initiative, is contracting
out much of its bioinformatics work to private industry in its project to bring
biological and clinical data together (Genomics England 2014). By contrast,
India has a small bioinformatics sector constituting barely 2 percent of the
biotech sector (FICCI 2012), and geared mainly to low level, routine bioin-
formatics services and not to the needs of advanced research (Interview 25).
Similarly, China’s bioinformatics industry is, as a director of a Chinese
university bioinformatics department put it, ‘‘small scale and low level,’’
focusing on the processing of bioinformatics data with little capacity for
‘‘challenging research work’’ (Interview 10).
Conclusions
As a case study of an emergent knowledge territory, bioinformatics pro-
vides important insights into the internal dynamic of science, the form of its
relationship with the state, the variations in that relationship across political
systems, and its contribution to the national and transnational politics of
innovation in the life sciences. No one doubts that science has power
through the exercise of epistemic control. What this article shows is that
the exercise of that power is contingent upon its ability to identify, shape,
and deliver on the needs of the state on a continuing basis. In the case of the
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life sciences, the governments of China, India, and the United Kingdom are
unanimous in their belief that bioinformatics should supply the link between
basic research and its translation into health benefits for the population and
the economy. Yet at the same time, as ambitious states vying for position in
the future global bioeconomy, they differ considerably in the strategy
adopted in pursuit of this goal. As the nature of the science–state concordat
varies, so does the ability of a state to exploit the opportunities offered by
emerging epistemic territories.
At the political heart of these differences lies the interaction between
epistemic change within the scientific community itself and the objectives
and apparatus of the state. In the United Kingdom, although there are
continuing tensions in bioinformatics between the epistemic domains of
mathematics and computer science, on the one hand, and biology, on the
other, they are tensions which have been institutionalized and managed
through the scientific community’s control of the research councils and
access to private funding bodies such as the Wellcome Trust. Led by geno-
mics and driven by the political imperatives it has generated, science has
recruited the United Kingdom’s competition state to a strategy that neatly
blends scientific interest, national ambition, and population benefit into a
convincing vision of the future. The state, for its part, is able to delegate to
science the thorny political issue of how to maintain the United Kingdom’s
position in the global competition for advantage in life sciences innovation.
With the state acting as facilitator and providing appropriate political and
financial support, science then takes responsibility for the delivery of a
common agenda. The customary concordat between science and state is
thus maintained.
In contrast, in China and India, the science–state engagement takes a
quite different form with different results. Both states lack an established
and self-confident scientific community with the capacity to define its own
agenda for the development of bioinformatics, relate that agenda to the
needs of the state, and advance it through the institutions of a mutual
concordat. Rather, India’s concordat is premised on personal rather than
institutional networks and China’s is too one-sided in favor of the state to be
described as a balanced political contract. Given the nature of the science–
state relationship in the two countries, there is no obvious mechanism to
facilitate negotiations between the epistemic partners of mathematics and
biology in order to produce a new discipline of bioinformatics capable of
energizing life sciences innovation. Individual scientists have taken the
initiative in India, but these have not cohered into a plausible strategy. In
China, scientists are unaccustomed to defining the future scientific agenda
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and so await guidance from a state apparatus that lacks the expertise to
construct it. In both countries, the absence of clear leadership from science has
left the developmental state to launch a series of policy initiatives in bioinfor-
matics backed by no clear conceptualization of their combined contribution to
life sciences innovation. By default, China and India have adopted a model
where bioinformatics continues to perform a service function to biomedical
science rather than a creative function to biomedical innovation.
Confronted by the hegemony of a Western science sustained in the field
of bioinformatics through a powerful global network of databases, scientific
organizations, governance, and supporting markets, both science and state
in China and India are obliged to wait in the wings for the opportunity to
participate in the bioinformatics revolution as supporting actors. Lacking
the ingredients of a science–state concordat to challenge this hegemony,
they are obliged to recognize the reality of a global politics of life sciences
innovation where power is embedded through the historic control of epis-
temic territory. Their experience is almost certainly not confined to the life
sciences. Given the variable capacity of scientific communities to construct
and present their agenda for new epistemic domains to the state, coupled
with the historic differences between countries in the institutional efficiency
of the science–state relationship, it can be anticipated that other fields of
science will be equally subject to the nuances of this political dynamic.
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